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The Border Policy Research Institute (BPRI) was established in
2005 in order to examine processes and policies related to the
Canada – U.S. border. The motivating factor was widespread
awareness that the border was impacting commerce and society to an increased extent in the post-9/11 era. The BPRI has
sought to understand and analyze border-related processes,
to explain policy implications, and to assist in the development
of new policy. The body of research we have undertaken since
2005 has pointed to significant problems in the efficient and
secure management of cross-border flows of trade and travel.
Although border management processes relate to a range of
policy areas, those related to cross-border trade and travel
flows are particularly significant in the context of the recent
economic crisis and the new post-election momentum to rethink
Canada – U.S. policy options. Our nations must aim to ensure
adequate security while not compromising our shared economic
future nor accepting cultural degradation in our borderlands.
This evidence-based report focuses on trade and travel
patterns at the border, how such activity has been affected
by security policy changes, and policy implications that could
inform business, governments, and other stakeholders charged
with developing the next generation of management of the
Canada – U.S. border.
Certain policy paradigms emerge when reviewing this report’s
contents: the efficacy of harmonized bilateral processes, as
opposed to unilateral solutions; the inappropriateness of rigid
“top down” policies in light of varied regional realities; the
ephemeral goal of absolute control of the border, as contrasted
with a risk-management approach.
The research products summarized within this report are
accessible via our website—see the URL in the masthead.
The research itself would not have been possible without financial support from the Washington State Legislature, the U.S.
Department of Transportation (Office of the Secretary, grant #
DTOS59-05-G-00016), and the BorderNet Initiative of the
Canadian government.

Canada is the most important export market for
the United States, and vice versa.

Canada is the primary foreign export market for 36 of the lower-48 states, and the second-ranked
market for all the others except New Mexico and Louisiana. For states in the northern Great
Plains, over 50 percent of their exports are destined for Canada, and in general, from one-fifth to
one-half of exports from the Midwest industrial states are Canada-bound. Canada is the largest
foreign supplier of energy (oil, natural gas) to the U.S.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS:
•
•
•

The economies of Canada and the U.S. are highly integrated. Any inefficiencies associated with crossborder commerce hamper our integrated economy and reduce our global competitiveness.
A renewed effort to reduce border-related inefficiencies is important during the current economic crisis.
From a viewpoint of economic self-interest, the U.S. – Canadian relationship should be of paramount
importance to both countries’ governments and citizenry.
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The volume of cross-border trade is dictated primarily
by macro-economic factors and policies.
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Value of U.S. Exports to and Imports from Canada:
Goods Crossing the Land Border via Truck and Rail
In the mid- to late-1990s, with NAFTA in effect and with a robust North American economy, twoway trade grew steadily. The progressive weakening of the Canadian dollar throughout that period led to greater growth of U.S imports than of exports, as the relative cost of Canadian goods
fell. In the early 2000s, in the aftermath of 9/11 and the ruptured “dot-com bubble,” trade was
stagnant for three years. With a resurgent economy in the late 2000s, two-way trade again grew
steadily. In that period, though, a strengthening Canadian dollar resulted in a narrowing of trade
imbalances, with U.S. exports almost equal to imports by 2007. Trucks have always carried the
vast majority of the trade.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS:
•
•
•

Each nation must create policies that are facilitative both of imports and of exports. The balance of trade
will differ over time.
Policies aimed at overall North American economic growth are of the greatest importance (e.g., the NAFTA
framework).
Other policies that influence the trading relationship, such as border-related processes, are also important.
At times, such policies can have greater impact than the macro-economic policies.
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Cross-border trade varies regionally, and northbound flows can differ from south-bound. Trade
funnels through a small number of major ports.
Value and Composition of Trade
at 5 Major Ports (October 2007)
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The kinds of goods crossing the border are
significantly different from port to port. A
security regime optimized for facilitation of
one group of commodities (e.g., manufactured goods) will thus be more effective at
some ports than others.
Accomplishing secure bidirectional trade
facilitation at a fairly small number of ports
can lead to reduced cost-of-goods for a
disproportionately large segment of the
integrated Canada – U.S. economy.
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS:

U.S. Imports
Champlain, NY

U.S. Exports

1—24

U.S. exports to Canada (carried by truck
and train) amounted to $19,051 million of
goods in October 2007. 68 percent of the
goods passed through the five ports
shown to the right, with Detroit singlehandedly responsible for 36 percent of the
goods ($6,902 million). In general, manufactured goods (commodity codes 82
through 96) comprise the greatest fraction
of U.S. exports to Canada. At Detroit,
such goods account for over 70 percent
of two-way trade, a much higher proportion than exhibited at any other port. In
contrast, U.S. imports from Canada include relatively greater proportions of resource-based commodities (agricultural
products, minerals/ores, refined metals,
wood). Manufactured goods are the
dominant fraction of imports only in the
Midwest industrial region. The crossborder economic integration in that region
is evident, with the commodity profile of
exports in that region (i.e., at Buffalo and
Detroit) almost identical to the profile of
imports. At Eastern and Western ports,
profiles of exports differ from those of
imports, and the balance of trade is not
as equal.

Other goods
Manufactured goods
Metals, metallic materials
Wood, fabrics, clothing, paper products, books
Minerals, ores, chemicals, plastics, rubber, fossil fuels
Food, beverages, agricultural commodities
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Trade is affected by border-security regimes.
Cross-border trade slowed after 9/11, with greatest impact upon U.S. imports from Canada.
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Figure 1: Aggregate U.S. Imports from Canada (annualized)
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Figure 2: Aggregate U.S. Exports to Canada (annualized)

Econometric analysis of trade data has shown that significant trade shortfalls developed in the
period immediately following 9/11—shortfalls that can’t be explained by typical factors such as
the overall trend of the GDP, the exchange rate, etc. While the shortfall in U.S. exports to
Canada was largely resolved by 2005 (as seen in the lower table), the shortfall in U.S. imports
persisted, with impacts more evident at certain ports. The increased cost of cross-border trade,
likely associated with higher costs of security compliance, is thought to be the problem.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS:
•

•

The ideal border inspection regime delivers heightened security, while imposing little or no added burden (in
terms of delay or cost). Post-9/11 security regimes are not yet close to the ideal, with negative economic impacts persisting for the integrated Canada – U.S. economy.
Harmonized security regimes could help address the issue of larger impacts upon imports than upon exports.
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The FAST program is intended to minimize the
impact of border-security processes upon truckborne trade. In Detroit, 44 percent of shipments
enter the U.S. via FAST lanes. Outside of the
Detroit region, FAST receives less use.
Blaine, WA

Buffalo, NY
The relatively low FAST utilization rate in areas other
than Detroit is a subject of
much research. The design
of the FAST program
meshes with the nature of
cross-border commerce in
the auto-belt—i.e., shippers
are sophisticated companies
able to afford the cost of establishing eligibility; carriers
are large firms carrying full
truckloads of a given commodity over a short distance.
At Blaine, in contrast, many
carriers are “mom and pop”
firms that can’t afford to establish eligibility. Many loads
consist of multiple consignments, meaning that the
truck can’t use FAST unless
all the shippers associated
with the load are enrolled in
FAST. And commodities that
have a supply chain that is
inherently difficult to secure
(e.g., agriculture) are more
prevalent.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS:
•

•

A FAST port has valuable infrastructure (a road lane and inspection booth) dedicated to the program, so
proof should exist that FAST enhances a port’s efficiency. Alternative infrastructure use should be evaluated in instances where efficiency gains are not evident.
Alternative program designs should be evaluated, aiming to lower the costs of entry.
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NAFTA tariff rules are a source of border-related
cost. Most tariff revenue derives from just a few
of the 100 “chapter-level” tariff categories. But
companies must verify compliance with NAFTA
rules-of-origin for all shipments, resulting in private-sector costs that yield no real public benefit.
Tariff Category (Top 10, Descending Order)

Revenue from Category's Share Cumulative Share
Given Category of Total Revenue of Total Revenue

62 - Apparel and clothing accessories (not knitted)

$4,389,441,874

17.4%

17.4%

61 - Apparel and clothing accessories (knitted)

$4,285,014,712

17.0%

34.5%

87 - Vehicles, parts, and accessories (other than rail)

$2,883,414,732

11.5%

45.9%

64 - Footwear and related goods

$1,873,663,256

7.4%

53.4%

85 - Electrical machinery, consumer electronics

$1,681,935,892

6.7%

60.1%

84 - Machinery, mechanical appliances, boilers

$1,161,471,270

4.6%

64.7%

42 - Leather goods, handbags, suitcases, saddlery

$997,761,085

4.0%

68.7%

39 - Plastics and plastic articles

$769,535,433

3.1%

71.7%

63 - Textile goods other than clothing and apparel

$678,851,851

2.7%

74.4%

94 - Furniture, lamps, mattresses, cushions, etc.

$407,576,790

1.6%

76.0%

Value of Duties Collected, by Tariff Category, upon Imports in 2006
(Total for All 100 Categories Combined = $25,159,011,720)
The great majority of tariff revenue is generated within a small number of tariff categories (HTS
chapters)—e.g., the 10 categories listed above account for 76 percent of the tariff revenue that is
collected. Many categories account for little or no revenue (i.e., there is no tariff imposed within
the given category). Yet the paperwork to verify compliance with NAFTA rules-of-origin for a
zero-tariff shipment can cost as much as two percent of the value of the shipment. One study
examined exports from Washington State to Canada, estimating the compliance costs associated with tariff categories for which both Canada and the U.S. impose a zero tariff. The study
found that the costs amounted to as much as $40.8 million per year. Eliminating the need for
shippers to demonstrate compliance with these “zero-zero” tariff categories would result in no
reduction in tariff revenue for either nation, yet provide significant benefit to shippers.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS:
•
•

Significant net economic benefit can be realized by reworking NAFTA tariff rules.
For zero-tariff categories, waiving NAFTA rules-of-origin would have no effect on tariff revenue. For
many other categories, the tariff is so small that the revenue lost by eliminating tariffs and waiving rules-oforigin would be far outweighed by the savings in private-sector compliance costs.
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Automobile traffic is heavily concentrated at a
small number of the 77 ports-of-entry (POEs).
Sophisticated security technology is likewise
concentrated at the larger POEs.
Detroit, MI—15,436 per day
Buffalo, NY—16,509 per day

19%

Blaine, WA—7,115 per day

20%
9%

30 ports handling
< 100 per day

1%

7%

Port Huron, MI—5,413 per day

13%

30 ports handling
100-1,000 per day
31%

13 ports handling > 1,000 per day

Number of Vehicles Entering the U.S. Daily via Various POEs, 2006
(Average Daily Total of 62,092 Vehicles)
As shown above, 86 percent of the cross-border auto traffic is accommodated by the 17 largest
POEs (those handling > 1,000 cars per day), with the remaining traffic dispersed among the 60
smaller POEs. The 77 POEs actually represent 121 separate roads, because a given POE might
consist of several nearby roads (e.g., the Buffalo POE consists of four bridges). Following the
principles of risk management (and cost containment), security technology (such as Radiation
Portal Monitors and License Plate Readers) has been deployed at the POEs that handle over 80
percent of the traffic. This means, though, that such technology is absent at a large majority of
the actual road crossings.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS:
•

•

Deployment of a full suite of technology at all 121 road crossings requires a budget several times larger
than past budgets. Absent such an investment, certain technologies can be defeated simply by crossing at a
smaller POE.
Confirmation should exist that the current pattern of technology deployment is optimal. From a riskmanagement perspective, would technology be better employed at the continental perimeter? At random,
varying locations on the internal highway grid?
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At the busiest POEs, most travel is discretionary
and most trips occur within a short distance of
the border. A borderland culture is evident.
Origins and Destinations of Cross-border Trips at
the Cascade Gateway (I-5 Corridor)
Canadian Residents — Trip
origins north of the border,
destinations south

U.S. Residents — Trip
origins south of the border,
destinations north
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In a 2007 study, 15,000
people were interviewed
to fathom travelers’
behavior in the Cascade
Gateway. On average,
91 percent of their travel
(combined weekend/
weekday) is discretionary.
Shopping, vacations,
recreation, and friend/
family visits are the
dominant trip purposes.
About two-thirds of the
trips begin and end within
30 miles of the border (as
the crow flies). Despite
the fact that long border
queues are common,
many travelers who cross
frequently (i.e., once per
month) are not enrolled in
NEXUS. At the Cascade
Gateway, the majority of
travelers are Canadians.
A similar study in the
Buffalo-Niagara region
reveals the same basic
pattern—a predominance
of discretionary travel and
near-border trips—
although Americans
comprise the majority of
travelers in that region.

125

POLICY IMPLICATIONS:
•
•

Significant reductions in border congestion can be achieved if more of the frequent border-crossers can be
persuaded to enroll in NEXUS.
Marketing of NEXUS should be targeted at population centers close to the border and at leisure travelers,
rather than business travelers.
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Passenger travel across the border is affected
both by security processes and by macroeconomics. At the POEs serving the I-5 corridor
(Blaine, Lynden, Sumas), the historic relationship between the exchange rate and the volume
of travel was disrupted in the aftermath of 9/11.
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For a 16-year period (1985 – 2001), the exchange rate correlated well with the number of people
(both Americans and Canadians) entering the U.S. at the I-5 corridor. An econometric analysis
was performed in an attempt to explain the disruption of that relationship in the aftermath of 9/11.
Several explanatory variables were analyzed, including the relative price of various goods and
services (gasoline, cigarettes, clothing, consumer electronics, health care), the relative wage levels in Canada, and the growing penetration of the Canadian market by “big box” retail chains. No
combination of variables was able to explain post-9/11 travel volumes. A structural break in the
relationship between economic conditions and travel volumes occurred in 2001 and has since
persisted. People’s discomfort with new inspection processes at the border is the likely cause of
low travel volumes.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS:
•
•

The border processes established in the aftermath of 9/11 have disrupted the social/economic fabric of
borderlands.
Borderlands have borne the brunt of the impact of heightened border security. Impacts include a persistent reduction in economic activity, and an undue budgetary burden as local jurisdictions handle the increased number of criminals arrested at the border.
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The post-9/11 traffic pattern at the four largest
POEs (Detroit, Buffalo, Blaine, Port Huron) has
been different from the pattern exhibited at the
border as a whole.
9/11
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73 POEs Other Than “Big 4”

Monthly Volume of Autos Entering the U.S. at Various POEs
In the period following 9/11, the “Big 4” ports exhibited different behavior than the aggregate of
the remaining ports. Traffic declined sharply at the “Big 4,” whereas the overall pattern elsewhere is more in keeping with macro-economic factors. At the “Big 4” there are large population
centers adjacent to the border, and discretionary travel (i.e., shopping, recreation, social visits)
has historically been dominant. It seems likely that discretionary travel was disproportionately
impacted by either the harsher nature of the post-9/11 inspection processes, or by the congestion resulting from the new processes. Meanwhile, at small ports it is more likely that the bordercrossing experience differs little from that of the past.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS:
•

•

Inspection processes (and/or the associated congestion) continue to impact the amount of cross-border
traffic at the largest POEs—Buffalo, Detroit, Blaine, and Port Huron. The programs thus far developed
to address the problem (e.g., NEXUS) are only partially successful.
New initiatives designed to restore borderland vitality should be contemplated. Initiatives should be
targeted at congestion relief and/or inspection-process modifications.
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SUMMARY OF POLICY CONCLUSIONS:
•

The economies of Canada and the U.S. are highly integrated. Any inefficiencies associated with
cross-border commerce hamper our integrated economy and reduce our global competitiveness.

•

The ideal freight-inspection regime delivers heightened security, while imposing little or no added
burden (in terms of delay or cost). Post-9/11 security regimes are not yet close to the ideal, with
negative economic impacts persisting for the integrated Canada – U.S. economy.

•

A renewed effort to reduce border-related inefficiencies is important during the economic crisis.

•

The kinds of goods crossing the border are significantly different from port to port. A security
regime optimized for facilitation of one group of commodities (e.g., manufactured goods) will thus
be more effective at some ports than others.

•

A FAST port has valuable infrastructure (a road lane and inspection booth) dedicated to the program, so proof should exist that FAST enhances a port’s efficiency. Alternative infrastructure use
should be evaluated in instances where efficiency gains are not evident.

•

Alternative program designs should be evaluated, aiming to lower the costs of entry to FAST.

•

Significant net economic benefit can be realized by reworking NAFTA tariff schedules.

•

The travel-related inspection processes established in the aftermath of 9/11 have disrupted the
social/economic fabric of borderlands.

•

Inspection processes (and/or the associated congestion) continue to impact the amount of crossborder passenger travel at the largest POEs—Buffalo, Detroit, Blaine, and Port Huron. The
programs thus far developed to address the problem (e.g., NEXUS) are only partially successful.

•

New initiatives designed to restore borderland vitality should be contemplated. Initiatives should
be targeted at congestion relief and/or inspection-process modifications.

•

Significant reductions in border congestion can be achieved if more of the frequent border-crossers
can be persuaded to enroll in NEXUS.

•

Marketing of NEXUS should be targeted at population centers close to the border and at leisure
travelers, rather than business travelers.

•

Deployment of a full suite of inspection technology at all 121 auto crossings requires a budget several times larger than past budgets. Absent such an investment, certain technologies can be defeated simply by crossing at a small port-of-entry.
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